Two Paths to Equality: Differences Between Rawls and Cohen on Equality

Authors

  • Jin Chen southwest university of political sciense and law Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.66581/gmpy4v62

Keywords:

difference principle, interpersonal test, radical luck egalitarianism, justificatory community

Abstract

In contemporary egalitarian theory, the debate between John Rawls and G. A. Cohen over justice and equality is especially representative. Rawls, beginning with a critique of utilitarianism, constructs the two principles of justice through the device of the veil of ignorance and establishes a liberal egalitarian path grounded in the basic structure of society. Cohen, from the standpoint of analytical Marxism, develops an internal critique of Rawls by challenging the scope of justice and the incentive argument. On that basis, Cohen, as a radical luck egalitarian, advances a theory centered on equal access to advantage, socialist equality of opportunity, and the community principle. He insists that justice must extend to personal choice and egalitarian ethos, and that theory should not compromise with self-interested motivation. Their divergence ultimately stems from different assumptions about human motivation and different theoretical commitments. They therefore represent two distinct paths to equality—one based on institutional accommodation and the other on moral purity. The comparison not only reveals the internal tension of contemporary theories of justice, but also offers important insights into the coordinated role of institutions and social ethos in the pursuit of equality.

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Published

2026-04-30

How to Cite

chen, jin. (2026). Two Paths to Equality: Differences Between Rawls and Cohen on Equality. Journal of Psychology & Education, 1(3), 21. https://doi.org/10.66581/gmpy4v62